Archive Article: The US And Iraq 16th August 02.
December 29, 2008

There is increasing debate over whether the United States will attack Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein. How has the US got itself into a position where a further war seems to be the only answer?

Back in 1991, when the US successfully drove Iraq out of Kuwait, the US was obliged to have limited war aims – and getting rid of Saddam Hussein was not one of them. The US achieved what it set out to do – it liberated Kuwait. The US very wisely decided not to drive on to Baghdad. It could then have been sucked into a Vietnam-type quagmire with Iraqis using guerrilla tactics.

Besides, the US did not know what else to do. If it had somehow managed to kill Saddam Hussein, there is no guarantee that his replacement would have been pro-American (after all, he is a ruthless person who had already wiped out potential contenders). The US could have brought in one of the leaders of the anti-Saddam Hussein groups living in exile in Europe. But there is no guarantee that such a person would enjoy wide support from the Iraqi people. Iraqi domestic politics is very complicated.

If the US had gone even further and destroyed Iraq, there is a risk that Iran or Syria – neither of which is pro-US – could have filled the power vacuum. This could have included getting access to Iraq’s oil wealth. Thus, the US could have unintentionally contributed to Iran’s strength (the US had backed Iraq in its war against Iran in the 1980s).

Iraq itself could have broken up into different ethnic groups and so added to the region’s instability. The Kurds in the north, for example, could have provided an example to the Kurds in eastern Turkey to continue their struggle for freedom. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia (with its Sunni Moslem population) would have been worried if Iraq’s Shi’ite majority got control of part of the country and so provided a foothold for Shi’ite-dominated Iran nearer to Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the US opted for a policy of sanctions to disarm Saddam Hussein and to buy time in the hope that there would be an internal rebellion against Saddam Hussein to topple him. There have been some rebellions (not least by the northern Kurds) but not what the US hoped for – and certainly none that has toppled Saddam Hussein. No one 11 years ago expected the sanctions to have to last this long.

There was a problem with the lack of scenario planning in the White House. No one asked themselves what would happen if the sanctions failed to dislodge Saddam Hussein. This was not an unusual question – after all, the US has had sanctions against Castro’s Cuba for 40 years and yet Castro is still there. Sanctions have had a very chequered history during the past century. They have worked against some countries in some circumstances but failed against many other countries in other circumstances.

No one thought through the implications of sanctions failing to do the job quickly. Thus, 11 years later, the US seems to have painted itself into a corner. No American President can now afford to be seen to be “soft” on Saddam Hussein. There is a growing impatience within the US to the end of the Saddam Hussein era.

But this impatience is not shared by many of America’s allies, which seem to have become reluctantly reconciled to Saddam Hussein’s staying in power.

Broadcast On Friday 16th August 2002 On Radio 2GB’s “Brian Wilshire Programme” At 9pm.